Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 26

January 1991

The Government Perspective: Effects upon Present Competition
Policy
Derek Ireland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Derek Ireland, The Government Perspective: Effects upon Present Competition Policy, 17 Can.-U.S. L.J.
189 (1991)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol17/iss1/26

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

The Government Perspective: Effects Upon
Present Competition Policy
Derek Ireland*
am pleased to have the opportunity to address this distinguished audience today. Howard Wetston, the Director of Investigation and Research of Canada's Bureau of Competition Policy, regrets that he cannot
be with us for this most interesting seminar. Other duties unfortunately
have intervened.
I have been the Director of Economics and International Affairs in
the Bureau of Competition Policy for a little less than a year now. Over
that limited period of time, I have become fascinated with the growing
linkages between antitrust and other areas of public policy.1 I would like
to cite just a few examples.
Competition policy rules are playing a critical role in the completion
of the European Community market under the Europe 1992 initiative.
This is evidenced by the use of competition policy to discipline the activities of member states in such diverse fields as state-aids, the operations of
state-owned corporations, government procurement and the deregulation
of previously highly regulated sectors such as financial services, telecommunications and the airlines industry.2
Differences in competition law and enforcement practices have been
raised often in the Strategic Impediments Initiatives talks between the
United States and Japan. Some trade specialists have argued that competition policy will be on the agenda for the next round of multilateral trade
negotiations (on the assumption that the current Uruguay Round comes
to a fruitful conclusion).
Intellectual property rights were an important factor in a recent Bureau case under the abuse of dominance provisions involving NutraSweet, 3 and are expected to be a motivating force in a growing number of
• Director of Economics and International Affairs, Bureau of Competition Policy (Ottawa).
I A discussion of the linkages between antitrust and other policy fields from a Canadian perspective is found in: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Bureau of Competition Policy, Canadian Competition Policy: Its Interface with Other Economic and Social Policies, A Framework for
Discussion (Ottawa: September, 1989).
2 A fuller discussion of this topic is found in: External Affairs and International Trade Canada,
Europe 1992, Working Group Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa: January, 1991).
3 A description of the NutraSweet case will be found in the forthcoming papers from an April
1990 Conference on Intellectual Property Rights jointly sponsored by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada and the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP). The volume is to be called
POLICY DEBATES, Global Rivalry and Intellectual Property: Developing Canadian Strategies,
Smith, Murray G., ed. (Ottawa: April, 1990).
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merger transactions in the coming years. It is incumbent upon all of us
with an interest in competition law to become more familiar and knowledgeable with the linkages between competition and other public policies.
In this regard, the Bureau expects that the research of the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy will play an important role in
helping to enhance our understanding of these complex policy linkage
issues.
This is why I find the issues surrounding the treatment of competition policy and antidumping under Article 1907 of the Canada-U.S.
FTA so intriguing. What I would like to do in this presentation is to set
out the current issues from the perspective of a Canadian competition
policy advocate, with particular weight on issues and developments
which could help to shape the Canada-U.S. discussions.
My presentation therefore focuses largely on economic, legal and
competition policy issues from the perspective of Canada's Bureau of
Competition Policy, and should not be interpreted as a statement of Canadian policy objectives. I would also like to state that, while the Bureau
continues to be favourably inclined towards a replacement regime from a
competition policy perspective, we recognize that there are trade policy
issues-as well as the views of the business community with respect to
the determination of negotiating positions-that will need to be tested on
both sides of the border.
Many of the issues now in play were presented to this same forum
almost four years ago by the previous Director of Investigation and Research, Cal Goldman.4 For those who heard or read his speech, I will try
to keep my comments on his text as brief as possible.
As you recall, four years ago, Canada and the U.S. were close to
completing the negotiations on the FTA. In his April 1987 address, the
previous Director posed three questions and in the nature of these things
proceeded to respond to each question within his address. It is, in my
view, worth revisiting these questions to provide a benchmark for more
recent developments.
The first question posed by Mr. Goldman was whether antidumping
was clearly negative in terms of its economic effects. Mr. Goldman
stated that the effects were clearly negative, arguing that antidumping
laws tend to protect competitors rather than competition and thus represent a serious impediment to the play of market forces in a free trade
area. In addition, he stressed that the removal of trade barriers under the
FTA should reduce the possibility that the price differentials addressed
by antidumping orders would persist.
The second question was whether competition law provides a more
suitable alternative to antidumping. His answer here was yes. Reliance
4 Goldman, Calvin S., Notesfor an Address on Competition,Anti-dumping and the Canada-U.S.
Trade Negotiations to the Canada/UnitedStates Law Institute of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Speech S-87-12 (Ottawa: April 3, 1987).
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on the price discrimination and predatory pricing laws is preferable, he
suggested, for two main reasons. First, it is consistent with the intent of
a free trade agreement to eliminate barriers at the border and ensure predictable and secure market access. Second, it enhances competitiveness
and the efficiency of the market place, and precludes actions against pricing practices which have little or no injurious effect on the competition
process.
The third question was what particular competition regime should
be put in place in a freer trade environment. This was and remains a
much more difficult question for which Mr. Goldman at that time did
not have all the answers. He noted that there are significant differences
in both the substantive and procedural provisions of the competition laws
of our two countries. Nevertheless, in relation to the substantive laws, it
was his view that the abuse of dominance provision adopted in 1986 in
the Canadian Competition Act could provide a useful building block. He
noted as well that there appears to be some movement in procedures
toward greater compatibility between the two legal systems.
This is evidenced by the growing support for private actions on both
sides of the border-assisted in Canada by the two recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada, particularly in City National Leasing v. General Motors of Canadawhich upheld the use of private actions in relation
to the price discrimination provisions of the Competition Act. In this
regard, he also noted the growing concerns in the United States regarding the application of treble damages. Mr. Goldman cited these procedural differences more as challenges than as problems to the use of
competition laws to discipline transborder pricing practices.
He concluded that, if a freer trade environment does arise, a great
deal of study is going to have to be devoted to this complex set of issues
pertaining to what kind of antitrust regime should be put in place. In
addition, he noted there are numerous other issues that require careful
attention, particularly the conflict resolution mechanism, and the perennial issue of extraterritoriality.
Mr. Goldman made one further point. He recognized that a good
deal of study was needed on the issue of whether the replacement of antidumping laws by antitrust laws between our two countries would leave
any significant gaps that warrant special attention. He concluded therefore that those who are experts in both fields are going to have a good
deal of work ahead of them if the trade discussions are to be successful.
The large body of research being reviewed during this seminar indicates
that considerable progress has already been made in this regard.
Turning to more recent developments, we are now in year three of
the ten-year phase-in period of the FTA. With respect to the substitute
regime work, we have seen significant progress in developing the knowledge base upon which future actions can be based. Let me identify three
of these.
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My department, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, funded a
January 1990 study by Lexenomics Inc. titled The Relationship Between
5
Competition Policy and Anti-Dumping Law: The CanadianExperience.
the
under
This study provided a good review of the Canadian experience
present antidumping regime and concluded that "a strong argument can
be made that Canadian competition law leans more towards standards
that promote efficiency than does Canadian anti-dumping law ....

."

The

authors noted that, while the pricing rules under competition law may be
imprecise, the enforcement discretion available to Canadian antitrust authorities makes them much more adaptable to prevailing economic theory on unilateral pricing, and facilitates a longer term perspective on the
consequences of pricing practices on competition.
Secondly, a paper is currently well advanced by Presley Warner and
6
Professor Michael Trebilcock of the University of Toronto Law School.
This study considers the theoretical coherence of antidumping laws and
proposes what is described as a workable solution to the antidumping
problem by outlining how Canada and the U.S. could amend their respective antidumping laws and bring about antitrust harmonization with
respect to pricing practices.
Thirdly, the Exposure Draft distributed in December 1990 of the
Study on Competition (Antitrust)and Antidumping Laws in the Context
of the Canada-U.S.Free Trade Agreement, prepared for the Committee
on Canada-United States Relations of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,7 offers many
insights and a set of conclusions based essentially on the retention of
national competition laws. At this juncture, I would like to commend
the Canadian and U.S. Chambers of Commerce for their valuable contribution to our body of knowledge on this subject.
Our initial reading of these technically complex documents suggests
to the Bureau that:
(i) Replacing antidumping with competition policy rules is not only
economically desirable but would also appear to be technically
feasible.
(ii) The replacement option would appear to be less complicated than
initially perceived. This option may not require full harmonization of competition policy rules but rather only a certain degree of
compatibility in law and practice as well as the institutional mechanisms needed to resolve any differences or disputes. To the exLexenomics Inc. (Ottawa: January 1990).
Presley Warner and Trebilcock, Michael J., Found Two ofthe Canada-U.S.Free Trade Agreement: The Casefor Replacing Antidumping with Antitrust. Unpublished, Ontario Centre for International Business.
7 Feltham, Ivan R., Stuart A. Salen, Robert F. Mathieson, and Ronald Wonnacott, Competition (Antitrust) and Antidumping Laws in the Context of the Canada-U.S.Free Trade Agreement: A
Study for the Committee on Canada-UnitedStates Relations of the Canadian Chamberof Commerce
and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States Exposure Draft 12/19/90.
5

6
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tent that amendments to our national laws are needed, these
should not be substantive and would not undermine the fundamental intent and enforcement policies of either Canadian or U.S.
law with respect to anti-competitive pricing practices.
(iii) Differences between Canadian and U.S. law and practice in the
areas of private actions, class actions, contingent fees and treble
damages-as outlined in the Chambers' excellent study- will
need to be addressed in further research and discussions. However, the questions posed by these differences appear capable of
resolution under a national treatment framework.
(iv) Consistent with the current economic thinking in the antitrust
field, the focus of the new replacement regime for the most part
would be on predatory pricing, where the seller clearly possesses
market power, not on the more general forms of price
discrimination.
(v) Any problems which remain in the areas of jurisdiction, information collection, enforceability, and extraterritoriality should be
comparatively easy to address under the FTA and other bilateral
frameworks already in place such as the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT), the Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust (MOU), and the biannual meetings between Canadian and
American antitrust agencies.
As well, some commentators have suggested that this bilateral process could afford a logical opportunity to address the export cartel exemptions of our respective competition laws in a mutually beneficial
manner.
Since Mr. Goldman's speech, there have been other developments
which in the Bureau's view tend to strengthen the arguments in favour of
replacing antidumping with competition rules under the FTA. These
are:
1. Developments under the Europe 1992 initiative.
2. The replacement of antidumping with competition policy rules under
the Australia-New Zealand free-trade arrangement.
3. The growing cooperation between the antitrust agencies in Canada
and the United States.
4. The evolving commercial interests of the Canadian and U.S. economies over the period of FTA implementation.
5. Work of the Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy on two enforcement guidelines on price discrimination and predatory pricing.
6. More general trends towards greater international harmonization
and compatibility of market framework laws and policies among the
modern industrialized economies.
I would like to briefly summarize the possible implications of these
developments for the topic of this conference.
European developments are establishing interesting precedents for
future work in this area. Mr. Goldman, in his earlier presentation to this
forum, emphasized that the European Community, at the outset of its
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development under the Treaty of Rome in 1957, had recognized the incompatibility of antidumping in its economic arrangement. Therefore,
members states do not maintain independent national antidumping laws
against other member states. In addition, the Treaty of Rome contains a
provision dealing with abuse of dominant position which provides for
uniform antitrust treatment of pricing practices among member states.
Also of interest in this regard is that the European Community and the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have agreed to complete their
discussions to exempt the EFTA countries from the Community's antidumping regime and to apply only the Community's competition policy
rules to EFTA-EC trade. The time could be coming when virtually all
intra-European trade will no longer be subject to antidumping regimes.
Many of us believe that the experience and success of the Europe
1992 initiative will place growing pressure on governments on both sides
of our common border to apply competition policy rules and related
measures to better integrate the Canadian and U.S. economies under the
FTA. In a similar manner, there could be pressure in Canada to reduce
the many interprovincial barriers which to date have prevented the full
integration of the Canadian economy and marketplace.
The situation within the European Community is in stark contrast
to the rapidly expanding application of antidumping rules to the Community's imports from non-EC countries. Sylvia Ostry, Patrick Messerlin and other experts in this field have noted with growing concern that
antidumping has become the "weapon of choice" among the western
economies for dealing with supposedly unfair trade, with the European
Community leading the way. In a recent paper,8 Mr. Messerlin
documented:
-the rapid expansion of the application of antidumping regulations in
less than a decade and a half from a position of insignificance to one
of dominance in the EC protectionist arsenal;
-how these regulations allow import-competing firms to dominate
trade policy formulation in the European Community;
-the extent to which these actions are undermining the GATT; and
-how the latest developments in EC antidumping regulation are being
used to distort not only trade patterns but also investment patterns
among countries.
Many analysts are worried that the possible spread of the North
American recession to the rest of the world will lead to even greater application of antidumping rules by European and other trade authorities.
The consequences would be even greater distortions of trade and investment patterns and further deepening of a worldwide economic downturn.
In a recent article, Ms. Ostry has argued that:9
8 Trebilcock, Michael J. and Robert C. York, eds. Fair Exchange: Reforming Trade Remedy
Laws. C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto and Calgary: Renouf Publishing Company, November 1990.
9 Id. at 20.
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Logically, the principle of national treatment under domestic competition policy should replace antidumping regulation. The same definition of undesirable pricing behaviour that is applied to domestic firms
should apply to foreign firms exporting into the domestic market.
She further argued that this reform would require a prior commitment to harmonize competition policy and perhaps go beyond harmonization to establish a supranational competition authority to deal not only
with disputes but also to handle transnational issues. It could be argued,
however, that to an important degree these issues already are being addressed bilaterally between the U.S. and Canada through:
-the similarity of Canada-U.S. competition law and practice in the
area of anti-competitive pricing, particularly with respect to predatory pricing where analytical approaches in the two countries are
converging:
-the close relations between our respective antitrust agencies, as evidenced by our biannual meetings in addition to our almost daily
informal contacts to discuss specific cases as well as enforcement
policy (such as the soon to be published Merger Guidelines and the
two enforcement guidelines on pricing noted earlier);
-the bilateral institutions which have been or in the future can be
established under the FTA.
Also relevant in this regard is the joint decision of the Australian
and New Zealand governments to drop the application of their respective
antidumping statutes to their bilateral trade, and instead to apply their
respective antitrust statutes. As an extension of their earlier free-trade
agreement, the two countries abolished their antidumping laws and enacted a Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power provision in their respective antitrust laws. Under this provision, both private parties and the
two antitrust agencies are able to take action based on a civil "balance of
probabilities" standard of proof. The critical question is whether the defendant seller possesses a significant degree of market power. The new
regime addresses refusals to deal and predatory pricing in the context of
misuse of market power, but does not penalize cross-border primary-line
price discrimination involving a company and its direct competitors (for
example, when a company charges different prices in two geographic
areas).
In a recent discussion of the replacement of antidumping with competition policy rules, Greg Cox, principal legal officer for the Competition Policy Branch in the Australia Attorney General's office, stated:
Harmonization is not replication. The object is not that we get mirror
legislation but that the pieces of legislation sit comfortably side by side
and that they effectuate a better market access across the TransTasman.
The Australia/New Zealand experience shows that the replacement
of antidumping law with competition policy rules does not require a full
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customs union but rather can be effectively implemented under a free
trade agreement. In their recent draft report, Presley Warner and Professor Trebilcock concluded from the Australia-New Zealand experience
that the abolition of anti-dumping laws in favour of harmonized antitrust
laws enhances economic welfare, is theoretically coherent and offers a
practical solution to the global increase in antidumping actions.I1
Discussions on replacing antidumping with competition rules will
also be coloured by future trade developments and in particular the extent to which the FTA truly results in a more integrated North American economy as intended under the Agreement. It is interesting to note
that the total value of trade between our two countries covered by antidumping orders increased substantially through the 1980's. In 1987,
about one-tenth of one percent of Canadian imports from the U.S. were
covered by antidumping orders, while in 1988, a much higher proportion, namely nine-tenths of one percent of Canadian exports to the U.S.
were covered by American orders.
The steel industry appears as the major "beneficiary" of antidumping orders in both countries, and therefore steel users have been the economic activities which have been most negatively affected by our
respective antidumping regimes. A report prepared by the Bureau about
three years ago illustrated how antidumping orders and other non-tariff
barriers on both sides of the border have not only hurt the competitiveness of North America's steel-using industries, but as well have retarded
the rationalization needed to make the North American steel industry
more competitive with offshore imports.'1
Generally, antidumping has been applied to a greater dollar value of
Canadian exports to the U.S. in comparison with Canadian imports from
that market. However, regardless of the past record, to the extent that
the recession hits Canada harder than the U.S. and Canada's export
trade continues to be impeded by antidumping regulation in the American and European markets (perhaps as one consequence should there be
a full GATT breakdown), the Canadian government could encounter additional pressure from the business community to apply antidumping
more often and to greater effect to the import trade of our major trading
partners, including the U.S.
At the same time, conceptually (and leaving aside the pressures of a
recession), one would expect that the opportunities for cross-border price
discrimination and predatory pricing would decline substantially as the
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers more fully integrate the North
American economy. Unless there are in place barriers to entry, other
competitive restraints, or licensing or other agreements based for exam10 Presley and Trebilcock, supra note 6, at 94.
11 Ronayne, M.F., R.D. Anderson and S.D. Khosla, Non-Tariff Barriers in Canada-US.

Trade: A Case Study of the Steel Industry (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Bureau of Competition Policy, Economic Policy and International Affairs Branch, June 1987).
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pie on intellectual property rights, expanded opportunities for arbitrage-supported in part by better information flows, reduced
transaction costs and closer corporate linkages resulting from the FTAshould make it increasingly difficult for the same seller to charge different
prices for the same or similar goods on the two sides of the border.
In addition, as our industries and companies become more integrated, an antidumping order in one country is more likely to hurt producer interests on both sides of the border and therefore undermine the
competitiveness of North American industry in competing against the
rest of the world. Under these conditions, the economic rationale underlying antidumping (which some argue is dubious at the best of times) and
perhaps more important the business pressure for antidumping actions,
could diminish substantially.
One possible complexity is the trilateral discussions on a free trade
area between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. Given that Mexico presently
does not have a competition law, this trade negotiation could complicate
the negotiations under Article 1907 of the FTA. However, in light of the
growing interest among developing and Eastern European countries in
antitrust law, this problem could be resolved in the relatively near future
through the development of a Mexican competition statute.
Turning to domestic enforcement matters, the Canadian Bureau of
Competition Policy has been attempting to address many of these pricing
issues in clarifying its enforcement policy in the areas of predatory pricing and price discrimination. Draft bulletins on these two subject areas
were circulated for comment in the Summer and Fall of 1990. We are
now attempting to incorporate the many helpful comments which we
received, before distributing the final documents over the first months of
1991.
The Bureau's draft paper on price discrimination attempts to reflect
the more recent economic thinking that price discrimination, rather than
being injurious to competition, may in fact be of assistance to the economy in realizing allocative efficiencies. The economic literature also
questions whether price discrimination law in fact protects small business
and whether small business needs the protection of that type of law. By
reinterpreting the specific statutory elements of the price discrimination
section of the Competition Act, the final guidelines on price discrimination will seek to provide broader scope for innovative pricing strategies.
The Bureau and the Director are also wrestling with many complex
issues in completing the predatory pricing document. These include:
-the link between market power and successful predation;
-the role of entry and exit conditions in the relevant industry and
market;
-the need to develop enforcement guidelines which, while discouraging price predation, would at the same time encourage vigorous
healthy price competition;
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-the price-cost relationships of the alleged predator and the target
firm(s).
The Bureau of Competition Policy believes that the publication of
the two enforcement guidelines on pricing will clarify some of the questions posed by the replacement option. First, the contents of the two
documents take account of economic principles which are recognized in
both Canada and the U.S., and benefitted from consultation with U.S.
antitrust authorities. Therefore, the guidelines should help to promote
greater compatibility in the application of competition law between our
two countries with respect to anti-competitive pricing practices. Second,
it is hoped that the guidelines will lead to greater understanding of the
appropriate (and inappropriate) role of government in disciplining pricing practices among the business and policy communities on both sides of
the border.
Returning to the policy linkage issues raised earlier, I would also
like to bring to your attention some research conducted by the Canadian
Bureau of Competition Policy on the links between international trade,
the territorial divisibility of intellectual property rights and trade, international price discrimination and competition law. This research, which
has been published in a working paper called IntellectualPropertyRights
and InternationalMarket Segmentation: Implications of the Exhaustion
Principle,12 indicates that territorially divisible intellectual property
rights differ importantly from traditional non-tariff barriers such as quotas and are not necessarily harmful to consumer welfare. The research
findings are consistent with recent advances in economic theory which
suggest that allowing patent holders to engage in third-degree price discrimination can enhance economic efficiency by providing increased incentives to make investments to open new markets. It is hoped that the
distribution of this working paper will further enhance our understanding of the roles of market segmentation and price discrimination in a
modern, increasingly globalized economy.
Turning to a final more general issue, there is growing pressure from
large and small companies alike in Canada for greater harmonization and
compatibility in market-based framework laws and policies between Canada and our major trading partners in such areas as competition law,
intellectual property rights, and company law. The interest in greater
harmonization was particularly evident in a survey of intellectual property rights conducted by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada about
two years ago. 13 Our consultations suggest this interest covers other ar12 Anderson, R.D., P.J. Hughes, S.D. Khosla, and M.F. Ronayne, Intellectual PropertyRights
and InternationalMarket Segmentation: Implications of the Exhaustion Principle (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Bureau of Competition Policy, Economics and International
Affairs Branch, October 1990).
13 The results from this research are summarized in: Intellectual Propertyand Canada'sCommercialInterests: A Summary Report, prepared by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada for the
Intellectual Property Advisory Committee (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990).
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eas of framework law. My department, Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Canada, is exploring these questions of harmonization, the alignment of
our statutes to international developments and the linkages between market-based framework laws and policies in a departmental priority project
called Canadian Marketplace/InternationalDirections headed up by
Howard Wetston, the Director of Investigation and Research.
To conclude, the view of the Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy is that the research and economic developments since Mr. Goldman
spoke to you nearly four years ago further strengthens the case for replacing antidumping with competition policy rules. The growing body of
evidence is generally consistent with the Bureau's view that the replacement regime would be economically desirable, technically feasible and to
the mutual advantage of both parties under the FTA. If amendments to
our existing statutes are needed, we expect these to be relatively minor.
The replacement regime would be fully compatible with a free trade
area, would help to promote a trade-enhancing model for future multilateral trade negotiations, and would be consistent with the forces of globalization and harmonization which currently are driving all national
economies. The Bureau believes that as the North American economy
becomes more integrated through the forces of the FTA, deregulation,
privatization, and law harmonization, the opportunities for anti-competitive pricing practices in cross-border sales should diminish and therefore
a replacement regime should not place an undue enforcement burden on
our antitrust agencies.
The decision of Australia and New Zealand to adopt the replacement option and the very different treatment afforded by the European
Community to members in contrast to non-members also provides some
important lessons for the future. A fundamental question posed by European developments is whether Canada and the U.S. will treat each
other as the Community treats the rest of the world, or whether Canada
and the U.S. will treat each other as members of an integrated economic
family.
At the same time, the Bureau recognizes that many legal and technical questions remain to be resolved, and many members of the business
community on both sides of the border remain to be convinced that their
long term interests will be better served by a replacement regime based
on competition policy rules. It is hoped that this seminar and the research discussed here will help to promote that understanding in both
Canada and the United States.

